THE UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE • HARVARD UNIVERSITY
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE

A Bulletin of Facts, Analysis, and Opinions
November-December 1994, Volume 1, Number 1


Contents

The Ukrainian Economy by Oleh Havrylyshyn

Our Publications

Avant-Garde Director Serhij Proskurnia on Contemporary Ukrainian Culture

Changing American Perceptions of Ukraine

The Seminar in Ukrainian Studies


FROM THE DIRECTOR

The bi-monthly bulletin Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine, which we here introduce to our readers, has two basic functions. First and foremost, it is meant to focus our Institute's resources, contacts and experience on the task of analyzing a wi de range of issues in today's Ukraine, particularly in the fields of culture, politics and economics. At the same time, our purpose is to inform our colleagues and those with various professional interests in Ukraine about the ongoing work of the Institut e itself.

From the time it was established more than twenty years ago, the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University saw its academic and research mandate in the broadest of terms: while building on the strength of its three endowed chairs in the Ukrain ian Studies Program, its general task was to define and develop that field in an interdisciplinary way, and to focus on Ukraine as a whole. At that time this was all the more pressing since under Soviet rule Ukraine and its culture, and most specifically Ukrainian Studies, suffered both from totalitarian control and colonial marginalization; Soviet policy, all but explicitly, was geared to reducing Ukrainian culture to a provincial status. The appearance of an independent Ukraine liberated many cultural a nd social forces and opened up remarkable opportunities in various academic fields. It also gave rise to problems and difficulties of unexpected magnitude.

In the course of the last six years, the Institute has been highly active in various academic projects in Ukraine and in the general field of Ukrainian Studies, most notably as founder of the American Association of Ukrainian Studies and as co-founder of the International Association of Ukrainian Studies. In that time, it has also served as a major, authoritative source of information on developments in Ukraine and as a forum in which dialogue with Ukraine and about Ukraine could occur in a highly focu sed and responsible manner.

The range of issues that were addressed in some of our recent conferences attests to the breadth of our interests: economic reform in Ukraine (jointly with the Kennedy School of Government), the issue of foreign investment in Ukraine, Ukraine's militar y forces, current ethnographic and foklore research in Ukraine and in Eastern Europe. The Institute also played a major role in organizing and, with the help of the Ukrainian Studies Fund at Harvard, providing significant material support for, the Interna tional Congress of Ukrainian Studies that was held last year in Lviv, Ukraine. In the last two summers we have added to our usual summer program an intensive one-week seminar on contemporary Ukraine which draws prominent speakers from various fields and p articipants from the academic, business and government sectors.

It is precisely this experience and this spirit of inquiry that we would like to bring to our bulletin. While Harvard Ukrainian Studies will remain our major scholarly periodical publication, Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine will sure ly fill an important need. Our format will include short analytical articles, interviews, discussion and dialogue, as well as brief reports on our activities. We invite your participation and we hope to deserve your attention.


George G. Grabowicz is Dmytro Chyzhevs'kyj Professor of Ukrainian Literature and Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute.


THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY

The following is an edited version of remarks delivered by Oleh Havrylyshyn at the 1994 Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Summer Seminar.

The last time I was at Harvard was a mere four years ago. In October of 1990 there was a conference organized by the Kennedy School on the Ukrainian economy. That was a full year before the putsch and independence. At that time nobody ex pected that four years later one would be talking about a country that had already been truly independent and had had the responsibility for the economy in its own hands for a full three years. I say that to some embarrassment, because the result of the U krainian government having had these responsibilities for the last three years is not the most praiseworthy.

I would like to focus not so much on what the economy is like, because that is not really so interesting. Things have not gone well, and this is well known. I want to make only two points. First, why is it that economic reform has not been taking place in Ukraine, and consequently the economy is in a sad state? Second, how can Ukraine and the West promote true progress and economic reform, and hence establish a solid base for an independent state, a secure and self-assured Ukraine?

Let me go through a chronological description of how economic policy management occurred in Ukraine starting from 1991-1992 to the present day. First, what was the task at the beginning of independence? Ukraine had two primary tasks starting in late 19 91 and 1992. The first was nation-building; the second, economic transformation from an essentially socialist, centrally planned economy to some kind of a market economy. The president at the time, Leonid Kravchuk, supported a deal with the democrats and the nationalists who chose to give priority to the first of these tasks, nation-building. As a consequence, right from the beginning there was a disadvantage because of the political transformation by the political institutions, the political forces of th e time.

One disadvantage was that the economy was not given the highest priority in that administration. As a result, Ukraine lacked a charismatic leader speaking for the need to transform the economy, as was the case in several other countries. Russia is the obvious comparison. I am uncertain how much reform Russia has done; nevertheless, it is an important difference that there was a charismatic leader, one of whose messages has consistently been the need to go ahead with economic reform. Certainly there is the same sort of thing in the Czech Republic with Vaclav Klaus, and I think it is fair to say with Lech Walesa in Poland. That was not the case in Ukraine, and proponents of economic reform did not have someone lighting the way for them in the society.

The second disadvantage was that Ukraine's task of economic transformation was further burdened and made even more difficult than that of Russia by the tremendous shock of energy price increases. At the time of independence, all the members of the then Soviet Union were able to consume petroleum pro-ducts at a price that was the equivalent of about 10-15 percent of world prices. As a consequence of independence, Russia and Turkmenistan were the only ex-porters on a net basis of petroleum products; all the others suffered from having to rely on these sources and to pay increasingly high prices. It is true even to the present day that if one examines all the deals that are made and the prices that are actually paid, one finds that oil prices are not paid 100 percent, but certainly by the middle or the second half of 1993, Ukraine was paying Russia something like 60-70 percent of world prices for its oil, compared to the previous 15 percent. The shock was not very well absorbed. Ukrainian policy makers di d not do their best in reacting to this price shock.

There was a third extra heavy burden upon Ukrainian reform: Ukraine did not have a strong friend in the West to promote its cause to insure that it had financial support, whether it was justified by economic programs or not. Thus it was unable to rely on the benefits of external financial support. There would have been two such benefits.

The first would have been more money to buy imported goods and therefore ease the pain of the adjustment process. The second, to be neither exaggerated nor overlooked, would have been that the pro-reform forces could demonstrate to their colleagues and the government that they had obtained something for their pro-reform orientation, namely dollars. Although there are counter-arguments, it is clear that the status of reformers within the society does depend among other things on whether they are able to come up with what they promised. They say, if we do the things they tell us to, the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank and others will help us; if we do not, the money does not come through, and our status as reformers declines.

There are thus three biases against economic reform. As a consequence of this attitude and factors militating against a strong reform effort, it is evident that Ukrainian reforms did not move forward. Very little changes: the system remains much as it is. There is a considerable amount of state support for industry and agriculture and people's daily life in the form of subsidies for apartments and energy and transportation, and a lot of support for some basic consumer goods. The state is still very sub stantially involved in the economy.

Without a thrust forward from the new political forces at the time of independence, without doing something parallel to what Walesa did, time elapsed, and in this time the opponents of reform were able to build up their strength. The nomenklatura, of course, would not be happy to see reform because they would lose their privileges. But it depends on what reform means. A modicum of reform helps, but too much reform hurts them. A limited reform, i.e., taking away central planning, taking away the discipline of the government over directors of enterprises, was actually good for them, because it increased the economic strength of these individuals. That much reform they went along with; more reform would have meant privatizing. These people may or m ay not have become managers of these enterprises. More reform would have meant they would not have automatic support from the government when they needed to undertake an investment, for example. Since reform did not move forward much in the earlier period in which the nomenklatura was in disarray psychologically and politically (1991-1992), they were expecting major changes, yet none occurred.

They did change slightly the way in which they maintained their control. In fact they have learned very quickly how to become superficial capitalists, that is, they set up new commercial entities, of which they are the owners, and which deal with the f actories of which their friends are directors. They find that they can reform a powerful group that pressures the government to provide them with support in a new way, not openly through the old Soviet system of simply financing the operations of enterpri ses, but by pressuring them for credits from the new central bank at very low rates of interest. These credits were just pieces of paper not backed up by anything, and which contributed to inflation.

Furthermore, the old elite undertook many new activities, for example, export. One of the most lucrative opportunities in Ukraine, which was starved for energy, was re-exporting petroleum. Why and how? First, at least until the end of 1993 the prices p aid for petroleum imported from Russia were far below normal prices. Second, if one had the right connections one could get an export license. Of course, there are quotas on exporting natural resources from Ukraine, but there are always exceptions that ca n be made by the appropriate ministry and the appropriate people at that ministry. One can then export petroleum or petroleum products even to Saudi Arabia. If they can buy petroleum, or a certain benzene shipped from Ukraine at a price that is lower than their production costs, they will do it. The Ukrainians ship it out because they are getting it at far below world prices, and still are able to make a profit. But these profits are for the most part private profits, and for the most part they do not com e back, becoming what is known as capital flight. For anyone who has experience of Latin America, that is a familiar term. People lack confidence in their own economy, their own currency, and do everything they can to go out of their own currency i nto dollars. For the lesser folk it is dollars under the mattress, for the affluent it is dollars in Miami or in Swiss bank accounts, whichever is closer. The numbers are staggering. For example, IMF experts working on Ukraine give a figure for 1993 alone of a little over 2 billion dollars, and they know that is underestimated. Unofficial estimates range from about 8 to 10 billion dollars total accumulated over ten years, or perhaps even more.

I compared the volume of capital flight in Ukraine with that in Mexico, Argentina and some other countries that experienced it in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a proportion of GNP, Ukraine reaches the same proportions as one finds in the most extr eme cases of capital flight, such as Argentina or Brazil in the mid-1980s. Some Ukrainians learned very quickly how to do business. What is happening is not only a deterioration of the economy because of the inflation that is fueled by the easy extension of credits. There is also a deterioration that is fueled by money being taken out of the country -- money that could have been used for either consumer goods imports or foreign investment. Indeed, the rates of investment as a proportion of GNP in Ukraine are well below 10 percent. Most standard economic analysts suggest that if one is investing much less of GNP, one is not even keeping up with depreciation. Thus, old capital is deteriorating, and so is productive capacity.

Most important, in the long run this undermines general confidence in the economy. Think what it does to the work ethic, when people see that the economy is getting worse, but there are many more Mercedes Benz on the street, and there is constant talk on the job about how much which government minister has in his Swiss bank account. Imagine that 95 percent of what people say on the streets is fictitious; still, it reveals that there is indeed something going on somewhere, and, as a consequence, people do not feel inclined to work harder in the process of nation-building. And regional or ethnic minorities, which may have initially gone along with the idea of building this nation, ask, what are we getting out of this nation? It is very easy when one thin ks of the picture of the economy in this way, and not simply in sheer numbers, to understand the so-called "sausage politics." Why should they be happy with the state of affairs in the nation of which they agreed to become a part? People who never worked very hard under the Soviet system are in fact working even less when they see the worsening of income distribution, and the growing gap between rich and poor. In the communist society it was there clearly: the elite did live much better. But when that gap increases very consi-derably and openly, there is a buildup in resentment as well.

Nevertheless, there is an interlude of reformist effort. I have sought to argue, and many people disagree, that Leonid Kuchma is a reformer. It was a surprise to me and many others in late 1992, after about three months of Leonid Kuchma's tenure as Pri me Minister, that he started talking about reform. When he was first appointed he was labeled a "red director." Some compared him to Arkady Volsky, the head of the Union of Industrialists in Russia, as being a reformer only for the large-scale industrial enterprises, and not for other sectors. But when he came to office and appointed the reform-minded Victor Pynzenyk as his vice-premier, it was a surprise to many in Ukraine. Why did it come to an end, and what were the consequences?

It failed for two reasons. The first reason was that the West did not use this opening opportunity to provide Ukraine with political as well as financial support in a timely fashion. This led to some disillusionment with the West and with the transitio n to market reform in the minds of Ukrainian policy makers. Subsequently there began a reinforcement of the "monopolistic capitalism" of the post-Soviet era. Managers of monopolistic enterprises reasserted their positions by making government provide them support and throw out credits from the budget indirectly, through the banking system. The budget did not look so bad, but it had exactly the same negative effect on the economy. The state monopoly continued.

With Kuchma now back as president, the prospects for reform have improved considerably. Still, there are some difficulties in the way of moving ahead quickly with economic reform. Within the Cabinet of Ministers and in the parliament, there is still a majority of people who are from the old "party of power" safeguarding their monopolist positions. The parliament would seem to be the chief obstacle because it is now dominated by a leftist coalition whose explicit policy is to return to some degree of so cialist arrangements as opposed to land ownership and large-scale privatization. This coalition is more afraid of Kuchma than it is of Kravchuk, and the latter (now a member of parliament) has not failed to use this to his advantage by having appropriate hints dropped about using the powers of the presidency to deal with a recalcitrant parliament. I do not think that parliamentarians actually fear that the parliament building in Kiev will be surrounded by tanks.

The other possible negative is slowness and hesitancy on the part of Western institutions of all sorts. There is a second -- maybe the last -- chance for reform, and this momentum, the "honeymoon period" between the Ukrainian government and the people, will last for only about six months.


Dr. Oleh Havrylyshyn is Alternative Executive Director for Ukraine at the International Monetary Fund. His article "How Patriarchs and Rent-Seekers Hijack the Transition to a Market Economy" will appear in an upcoming issue.


OUR PUBLICATIONS

Because many people have asked about book publications at the Institute, we are providing here some frequently asked questions with responses by Robert De Lossa, Managing Editor of the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies:

What series are published by the Institute?

The Institute publishes five series: the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (HSUS), the Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies (HPUS), the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature (HLEUL), Renovatio, and an Ottoman and Black Sea Studies series.

With which institutions does HURI cooperate in the publishing field?

The Publications Office at HURI has published jointly with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Institute of Ukrainian Archeography in Kiev, Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Lviv), the Polish Academy of S ciences (Institute of Slavic Studies), the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales in Paris, the Istituto Universitario Orientale in Naples, and the Center for Jewish Studies at Harvard University.

What is the Institute's actual role in publishing?

All phases of publishing, except for printing, are carried out at the Institute. Jacket design is handled by an award-winning private firm close to the Institute. The Institute makes use of desktop publishing and has consistently utilized the lates t technology in its books. It also has set style guidelines for Ukrainian Studies that is being made available to this growing field.

What has been the critical reception of HURI publications?

HURI has a mandate for high scholarship and careful editing. We are proud that our books have consistently enjoyed very positive reviews from journals worldwide. As well, we have won national awards for the technical execution of our books. In what languages does HURI publish? HURI publications in the United States appear in English (except for facsimile volumes of HLEUL). HURI currently is translating some of its books into Ukrainian for distribution in Ukraine. The Institute of Ukrainian Archeogr aphy in Kiev is our partner in this venture.

Where does the money for the books come from?

A number of generous donors have set up endowments at Harvard University through the Ukrainian Studies Fund, Inc., for the publication of books in Ukrainian Studies. Their names appear in the initial pages of our books. We also, of course, derive r e-venues from sales.

How are HURI books distributed?

Our books are distributed by Harvard University Press and directly through the Institute. The Institute also has a bookstore that stocks Institute publications and Ukrainian Studies publications of other publishers.

What has HURI published recently?

Recent publications in HLEUL include The Hagiography of Kievan Rus' and The Edificatory Prose of Kievan Rus' (including the Izbornik of 1076). Both these volumes are translations into English. This series now is recognized as a basic resourc e for university courses in the field. Recent publications in HSUS include Meletij Smotryc'kyj by David Frick, The Ukrainian Economy, edited by I. S. Koropeckyj, and Republic vs. Autocracy by Andrzej Kaminski. Recent publications in H PUS include Political Communities and Gendered Ideologies in Contemporary Ukraine (The 1994 Petryshyn Memorial Lecture) by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Poland between East and West (The 1994 Zaleski Memorial Lecture) by Andrzej Walicki, and P roceedings of the First Conference on the Armed Forces of Ukraine (May 1994).

The Ukrainian Research Institute's telephone number is (617) 495-4053. Individuals interested in supporting HURI publications with financial gifts should contact the Ukrainian Studies Fund, Inc. (USF) at the same address. It goes without saying that gi ven the increased number of projects that we are receiving and the ever increasing requests for books that we receive from scholars and private citizens in the Central and East European countries, our need for renewed financial commitment from the public has also increased. The purchase of our books is an excellent way to support the scholarship that those books represent. For those wishing to support a specific project with recognition as the volume's patron, please contact USF. They can inform you of up coming publications plans and help you select an appropriate project.

Following is a list of recent and forthcoming publications of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University.

Republic vs. Autocracy: Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686-1697. By Andrzej Kaminski. 313 pp. 1993. ISBN 0-916458-45-8 (cloth); ISBN 0-916458-49-0 (paperback).

Meletij Smotryc'kyj. By David A. Frick. 450 pp. map, illus. December 1994. ISBN 0-916458-55-5 (cloth); ISBN 0-916458-60-1 (paperback).

The Origins of the Old Rus' Weights and Monetary Systems. By Omeljan Pritsak. 150 pp. map, illus., photographs. Spring 1995. ISBN 0-916458-48-2 (cloth).

Ukrainian Futurism. By Oleh Ilnytzkyj. 375 pp. color and b&w illus. Spring 1995. ISBN 0-916458-56-3 (cloth); ISBN 0-916458-59-8 (paperback).

Political Ideologies and Gendered Communities in Contemporary Ukraine. (The 1994 Vasyl and Maria Petryshyn Memorial Lecture.) By Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak. 27 pp. map. ISBN 0-916458-72-5 (pamphlet). November 1994.

Poland between East and West. (The August Zaleski Memorial Lecture.) By Andrzej Walicki. 63 pp. map. ISBN 0-916458-71-7 (pamphlet). October 1994.

The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History. By Kostyantyn Morozov, Mark Von Hagen, John S. Jaworsky, Zenon Kohut, et al. (Proceedings of the First Conference on the Armed Forces in Ukraine). 150 pp. illus. ISBN 0-916458-73-3 (pamphlet). January 1995.

The Edificatory Prose of Kievan Rus'. Translated by William R. Veder, with introductions by William R. Veder and Anatolij Turilov. (English Translations, vol. 6). 1994. 259 pp. ISBN 0-916458-54-7 (cloth); ISBN 0-916458-48-X (paperback).

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle. Translated and with an introduction by George Perfecky. (English Translations, vol. 9). Early 1995. 250 pp. map. ISBN 0-916458-70-9 (cloth); ISBN 0-916458-68-7 (paperback).

AVANT-GARDE DIRECTOR SERHIJ PROSKURNIA ON CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN CULTURE

Ukrainian art today is a very complex phenomenon. Our culture, as well as science, education, politics, and economics, is in a process of sharp differentiation. One the one hand, there is the old generation of the nomenklatura, which still p lays a major role in all areas of social and cultural life, and tries to shore up its system of values. Instead of glorifying the Communist Party, they now glorify "free and independent Ukraine"; instead of iconifying Lenin, they iconify Shevchenko, makin g an idol of him. These are the people who "own" material culture: galleries, theaters, mass media, philharmonic orchestras, concert-halls, publishers.

On the other hand, another culture is developing in Ukraine. It is represented by young people who have almost nothing to do with the establishment, who are open-minded. They do not "own" anything, but create modern culture and art. They are open to th e free ex-change of ideas among each other and their colleagues around the world.

Each month these two poles of culture drift further and further apart, and it is not just the generation gap that is deepening. It is sad to observe how people who have all the material possibilties for creativity--financing, space, access to archives, etc--do not create anything interesting. One of the explanations of such impotence is the motivation behind their work. The old culture creates on inertia, which is maintained by material endowments, while the new one creates on pure idealism and the sea rch for new forms of expression and new identities.

Here is an example. In the new social situation, prominent old official theaters simply do not know what to do. They are taken over by the mass audience, and they satisfy its demands with Mexican-style melodramas. There is nothing wrong with melodramas as long as there is something else. Producers who are younger also understand the importance of the marketability of their works, but they give their plays some authentic emotional character, content, depth. Most of them turn to the Ukrainian classics -- Hryhorii Skovo-roda, for instance.

The differences are most clear when one looks at festivals. Traditionally, all the festivals were organized by the Ukrkontsert administration, which ceased to exist only in July 1994. This bureaucracy was headed by Mr. Sharvarko. Perhaps shar avarshchyna in modern Ukrainian culture comes from him? For many years this person directed festivals devoted to anniveraries of the Communist Party, to the Komsomol, to Lenin, and to the Revolution. He created his own school and educated a whole host of directors sharing a style and a way of thinking.

At present, the same people stage festivals devoted to Shevchenko, to Ukrainian independence, to Easter, and to Christmas. It does not really matter for them what kind of festival to stage. With equal success, or failure, it could be a festival devoted to Russian-Uk-rainian friendship, or the Days of Kiev. They all have one and the same scheme, or stereotype, which they use because their imagination was destroyed by the system and their thinking is inflexible. At any of these official events you will f ind choruses and dances with a surrogate national flavor, and hardly different from those of Soviet times. The structure of performance remains essentially the same. One can easily predict all the components of such a festival; there will be no paradoxes.

Recent avant-garde festivals also have all the elements of the old ones, but for a different reason -- they parody them. But avant-garde perfomances also have new themes, very acute and existential. And most im-portant, they have style. Some of them, f or example, try to include their audience, which has been just a passive observer for decades, in the perfomance. Breaking stereotypes is not an easy task, however.

This brings me to the question of criticism. The Soviet school of criticism is a byproduct of Soviet culture. With its ideological base collapsing, the best it can do is to inform the audience about what is happening in our culture. I wish it could pre sent a program of restructuring our cultural institutions, but it will pro-bably take a long time to develop this attitude, mostly because we still are not free of the old ideology, and a new one has yet to emerge. Our system's goal, both past and present , is not to give the individual a chance. The new system may create the illusion of limitless chances, but it is all the same. Both critics and artists have to answer for themselves the question, "How new is this new order?" The more we question it, the m ore chances we have to build a truly new Ukraine.


Transcribed by Gleb Nechayev


CONFERENCE ON UKRAINIAN MILITARY HISTORY

The state flag of Ukraine was raised in front of Harvard's University Hall on May 12-13, 1994 side by side with the flag of the United States, in honor of a Ukrainian-American military conference organized by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institut e and the National Defense University's Institute for National Security Studies.

Titled "The Military Tradition in Ukrainian History: Its Role in the Construction of Ukraine's Armed Forces," the conference brought American scholars specializing in general and military history and political science, as well as officials of the Depar tment of Defense, together with their Ukrainian colleagues. Representing the Ukrainian side were Col. Gen. Kostyantyn Morozov, the first Defense Minister of sovereign Ukraine; Lt. Gen. Ivan Olenovych, Deputy Superintendent of the Military Academy of the A rmed Forces of Ukraine; Col. Ihor Smeshko, Defense, Military, Naval and Air Force Attaché at the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington; and Col. Yuri Levchenko, Chief of the Foreign Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The initiators and organizers of the conference were Dr. Lubomyr Hajda, Associate Director of the Institute, and former Institute associate Bohdan Pyskir; Nadia Schadlow coordinated contacts with the U.S. Department of Defense. Maj. Gregory Perchatsch and Capt. Harald Buch holz, both U.S. army officers interning at the Institute, assisted in organizing the event.

Dr. Hajda opened the two-day conference, after which Dr. Zenon Kohut, Director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, spoke on "Making the Armed Forces Ukrainian: The Role of National (Non-Soviet) Military Traditions." Lt. Gen. Olenovych provi ded commentary.

At the official dinner held at the Harvard Faculty Club, Gen. Morozov spoke on "Current Ukrainian Military Policy and Problems of Its Formulation."

On the second day of the conference, Professor Mark von Hagen of Columbia University addressed the topic of "The Soviet Military Tradition and Its Legacy in Ukraine." Col. Ihor Smeshko commented on the presentation. Next Professor John Jaworsky of the University of Waterloo discussed "The Transition from a Soviet Military in Ukraine to a Ukrainian Military," with commentary by Col. Yuri Levchenko. Dr. James Brusstar of the Institute for National Strategic Studies made concluding remarks.

The participants from Ukraine also met with Institute Acting Director Professor Roman Szporluk and members of the Institute staff, associates, and Ukrainian students. Various cultural and official visits at Harvard and beyond were organized. The delega tion from Ukraine met informally with Boston's Ukrainian community.

CHANGING AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF UKRAINE: THE HARVARD UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE SUMMER SEMINAR

"Ukraine: Current Trends, Future Prospects" was the theme of the intensive summer seminar held at the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University on July 31- August 5, 1994. The program, now in its second year, was conceived as a partial respons e to the new situation brought about by Ukrainian independence and numerous calls to the Institute for analytical information on contemporary Ukraine on the part of academics, government offices, representatives of the media, people involved or considerin g being involved in business in Ukraine, and many others.

Approximately half the participants were sent by US government agencies: these were primarily analysts, specialists in Ukrainian affairs at their respective offices. Others were from the private sector. The majority of the participants already possesse d significant expertise in their particular Ukrainian fields of interest, and these added to the depth of the discussions. In contrast to the situation just a few short years ago, when such people were by and large novices in Ukrainian affairs, this level of expertise reflects the evident importance of Ukraine in the international arena as a serious subject of study at the highest level.

The program was intended to provide both a general picture of the situation in Ukraine and in-depth analysis of particularly important issues. The five days were dedicated, respectively, to domestic politics, society and culture, law and economy, forei gn affairs, and security issues. The speakers included both academics and practitioners -- a combination that provided a variety of perspectives on the various topics of discussion.

Like the first summer seminar, held in 1993, this session met with a favorable response from the participants. Many of last year's attendees have continued to stay in touch with the Institute, and some returned to take part this summer. The participant s expressly requested to be informed about the Institute's projects, programs, and publications in order to be in touch with the Institute on a long-term basis. Many of them stressed that the Institute is a unique national resource for governmental and bu siness institutions as well as for scholars.

One of the attendees said: "The seminar was very informative on a broad range of topics, particularly about US policy on Ukraine. It high lighted the importance of Ukraine in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR and reassured me that there is a lot of first-rate political and economic policy thinking coming out of academic institutions and government policy institutions as well as non-profit think-tanks. It is important to take steps to support Ukraine in order to avoid a disastrous situation a s in Bosnia, and to promote a smooth transition for Ukraine to a market economy. The seminar allowed a lot of fresh thinking, and we could try out new ideas during the discussion that was part of our daily routine.

UKRAINE: CURRENT TRENDS, FUTURE PROSPECTS
1994 Intensive Summer Seminar

August 1
Domestic Politics
"Ukraine's Transition to Sovereignty and Problems of Nation-Building: An Overview" Lubomyr Hajda, Harvard University
"National Politics: President, Parliament, Parties, Programs" Zenovia Sochor, Clark University and Ukrainian Research Institute
"Democratization and Ukraine's Evolution toward a Civil Society: A Balance Sheet" Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, National Endowment for the Humanities
"Ukraine: Post-Colonial Realities in 1994" Roundtable discussion involving the Summer Institute's students and teaching staff from Ukraine

August 2
Politics, Society and Culture
"Ethnicity and Politics in Ukraine" Orest Deychakiwsky, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
"Churches and the Politics of Religion in Today's Ukraine" Borys Gudziak, Institute of Church History, Lviv
"National Identity in Contemporary Ukraine" Yaroslav Hrytsak, Lviv University
"Culture and Society in Ukraine Since Independence" Oksana Grabowicz, Ukrainian Research Institute
"Film and Music in Contemporary Ukraine" Virko Baley, University of Nevada

August 3
Law and Economics
"Lawmaking and the Law in Ukraine" Walter Lupan, Ukrainian-American Bar Association
"Flashpoints: Ukraine's Demographic, Nuclear, and Energy Crises" David Marples, University of Alberta
"Ukrainian Economic Reforms and External Financing" Oleh Havrylyshyn, International Monetary Fund
Roundtable Discussion: "Doing Business in Ukraine"
"Chornobyl: Myths, On-Site Findings, and Their Implications" Alexander Sich , MIT

August 4
Foreign Relations
"Ukraine's Place in the International Arena" Paul Goble, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Roundtable Discussion: "Ukrainian-Russian Relations" Paul Goble, David Marples, Zenovia Sochor "Ukrainian-American Relations" Roman Popadiuk, former US Ambassador to Ukraine
"The Making of US Policy toward Ukraine: The Roles of the US Administration and Congress, the Embassy of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian-American Community" Eugene Iwanciw, Ukrainian National Association

August 5
Security Issues
"Ukraine's Armed Forces and Military Policy" Nadia Schadlow, US Department of Defense. Commentator: Ihor Smeshko, Embassy of Ukraine
"Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons and International Security" Sherman Garnett, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

SEMINAR IN UKRAINIAN STUDIES
1993-94 ACADEMIC YEAR

October 7 "Poland in Ukrainian History"
Ihor Shevchenko, Dumbarton Oaks Professor of Byzantine History and Literature, Emeritus, Harvard University

October 14 "Does Ukraine Have a History?"
Mark von Hagen, Associate Professor of History, Columbia University

October 21 "Problems of the Rus' Primary Chronicle: Where was 9th-Century Moravia?"
Horace G. Lunt, Samuel Hazzard Cross Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Emeritus, Harvard University

October 28 "Prospects for Economic Reform in Ukraine"
Leonid Kistersky, Chairman, National Centre of the Implementation of International Technical Assistance to Ukraine, Kiev, and E.L.Wiegend Distinguished Visiting Professor, Brown University

November 4 "Chornobyl Revisited: Myths, On-Site Findings, and Their Implications"
Alexander Sich, Ph.D. candidate in Nuclear Engineering, MIT

November 18 "The Dynamic Ontology of the 18th-century Philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda"
Andrei Romenets, Institute of Philosophy, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Kiev, and Visiting Scholar, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

December 2 "Ukrainian Literature and the Erotics of Post-Colonialism: Some Modest Propositions"
Marko Pavlyshyn, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Monash University, Australia

December 9 "National Consciousness of Students in Contemporary Ukraine: A Sociological Analysis"
Natalia Chernysh, Associate Professor, Department of Theory and History of Culture, Lviv University

December 16 "The Implications of Ukraine's Demographic Situation at the Oblast' Level"
Oleh Wolowyna, Senior Policy Specialist, Research Triangle Institute, Chapel Hill, North Carolina

February 3 "Reconstructing the History of an Underground Church: The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the Soviet Union, 1945-1989"
Borys Gudziak, Director, Institute of Church History, Lviv, Ukraine

February 10 "In Search of a Separate Identity: Poland's and Ukraine's Path to Europe"
Andrzej Kaminski, Associate Professor of History, Georgetown University

February 17 "The Pathos of Populism in Ukrainian Literature: The Meanings and Metamorphoses of 'Kotliarevshchyna' "
George G. Grabowicz, Dmytro Chyzhevsky Professor of Ukrainian Literature and Director, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

February 22 "Is Russian Nationalism Expansionist by Nature? Observations on and a Consideration of the Ukrainian Case"
John B. Dunlop, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

March 10 "The Search for a New Political Identity in Ukraine and the Impact of Western Values"
Vadim Voinov, Associate Director, Department of Communications and Cultural Studies, Kiev University and Visiting Scholar, Ukrainian Research Institute

March 17 "Kiev, Moscow and the Donbas: Regional Identity in Historical Perspective"
Hiroaki Kuromiya, Associate Professor, Department of History, Indiana University

April 7 "Modernism vs. Populism in Fin de Siecle Ukrainian Literature: A Case of Gender Conflict"
Solomea Pavlychko, Senior Research Associate, Institute of Literature, Academy of Sciences, Ukraine and Visiting Scholar, Ukrainian Research Institute

April 14 "Macro-Economic Regulation of the Ukrainian Economy in Transition: Problems and Prospects"
Vasiliy Litvinov, Chief of Sector of Macro-Economic Regulation, Scientific Research Institute, Ministry of Economy, Ukraine, and Humphrey Fellow, Boston University

April 21 "Language Loyalty in the Melting Pot of Nations: Ukrainian in the United States"
Bohdan Azhniuk, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of the Ukrainian Language, Academy of Sciences, Kiev, and Visiting Scholar, Ukrainian Research Institute

April 26 "Political Communities and Gendered Ideologies in Contemporary Ukraine" (Petryshyn Memorial Lecture)
Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington

April 28 "The State of Science and the Development of Non-Governmental Professional Societies in Ukraine"
Oleksander Slobodyanyuk, Professor of Physics, Kiev University, and Chairman, Coordinating Committee of the Ukrainian Physicists' Society

IN UPCOMING ISSUES OF PERSPECTIVES:

HARVARD UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 1993-1994
HARVARD FACULTY MEMBERS:
George G. Grabowicz (Director), Stanislaw Baranczak, Timothy Colton, Michael S. Flier, Edward Keenan, Roman Szporluk.

PROFESSORS EMERITUS:
Horace Lunt Omeljan Pritsak, Ihor Shevchenko.

INSTITUTE ASSOCIATES:
Peter Brown (University of Connecticut, Eastern European History), Harvey Goldblatt (Yale University, Slavic Languages and Literatures), Oksana Grabowicz (Anthropology/Ukrainian Culture), Patricia K. Grimsted (Russian and Ukrainian Archives)

INSTITUTE STAFF:
Robert De Lossa Lubomyr Hajda Sheila Kelly Ksenya Kiebuzinski Dana Miller Barbara A. Rotger Andrew Sorokowski

VISITING SCHOLARS:
Bohdan Azhniuk (Institute of the Ukrainian Language, Kiev), Alexander Grishin Art History (Australian National University), Ihor Ostash (International School of Ukrainian Studies, Kiev), Solomea Pavlychko (Institute of Ukrainian Literature, Kiev), Andrei Romenets (Institute of Philosophy, Kiev), Vadim Voinov (Communication and Area Studies, Kiev University), Oksana Zabushko (History of Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Kiev)

Associated Graduate Students:
Mark Baker, Doctoral candidate (History Department), Marius Cybulski (Special student, Harvard Divinity School), Leonid Heretz (Doctoral candidate, History Department), Fiona Hill (Doctoral candidate, History Department), Matthew Kay (Doctoral candidate, Slavic Department), Jarmo Kotilaine (Area Studies: Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia), Michael Lysobey (Area Studies: Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia), Federica Lamperini (Doctoral candidate, Slavic Department), Lidia Stefanowska (Doctoral c andidate, Slavic Department), Alexander Pivovarsky (John F. Kennedy School of Government), Taras Koznarsky (Doctoral candidate, Slavic Department), Gleb Nechayev (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT AFFILIATES: Ivan Bilaniuk, Dzvinka Dobrianska, Mark Howansky.

COURSES OFFERED:
History 1251. Medieval and Early Modern Russia - Edward L. Keenan
History 1537. 19th-Century Ukraine - Roman Szporluk
History 1541. 20th-Century Ukraine - Roman Szporluk
History 1542. States and Nations - Roman Szporluk
History 2290. Socialism and Nationalism: Seminar Roman Szporluk
Linguistics 250. Old Church Slavonic Michael S. Flier
Slavic Ga. Elementary Ukrainian I -.Matthew Kay
Slavic Gb. Elementary Ukrainian II - Robert De Lossa
Slavic 225. Ukrainian Poetry from World War II to the Present - George G. Grabowicz
Slavic 255. Ukrainian Dialectology - Michael S. Flier
Slavic 291. Problems in the History of Early Ukrainian Literature - George G. Grabowicz
Slavic 295. The Language of Medieval Novgorod: Seminar - Michael S. Flier

PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE
EDITORIAL BOARD:
Andrew Sorokowski, Editor
Gleb Nechayev, Associate Editor
Sheila Kelly, Assistant Editor

ADVISORY BOARD:
George G. Grabowicz
Roman Szporluk
Lubomyr Hajda

Annual subscription $25. Call (617) 495-4053, or fax (617) 495-8097

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
1583 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge MA 02138


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